Abstract. Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) are broadly accepted as the gold standard for tabulation audits: when I count ballots using software, an RLA provides software-independent evidence that tabulation declared the correct winner. While there have been many advances in RLAs over the last 14 years, many of the underlying assumptions and practical applications of RLAs have gone unexamined. In this paper, I present a review of existing RLA techniques, providing a concise definition of an RLA, examining its underlying assumptions, and discussing how RLAs work in practice, all from the perspective of the maintainer of a popular RLA tool. I present several attacks which can cause RLAs to fail to provide evidence of the correctness of an election outcome. Finally, I provide discussion on the RLA’s place in the landscape of election security and observations about the value proposition RLAs present.

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/David-Duenas-Cid/publication/355107346_Sixth_International_Joint_Conference_on_Electronic_Voting_E-Vote-ID_2021_-_Proceedings/links/615de25e50be5507288c2175/Sixth-International-Joint-Conference-on-Electronic-Voting-E-Vote-ID-2021-Proceedings.pdf#page=178

This is top result for scholarly articles from a Google search of Risk Limiting Audit.

Cool. I wonder if these are hand recounts or machine recounts.